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Abstract 
The controlling shareholders of Korean firms usually attempt to pass on the firm to the next generation and stock 
gifts are the most evident form of the ownership transfer. I examine how equity market investors react to the 
announcement of stock gifts given by controlling shareholders. Prior literature documents evidence that 
controlling shareholders use their private information and discretionary power to time stock gifts at lower stock 
prices in order to reduce gift taxes. I observe significant positive excess returns when controlling shareholders 
transfer stocks to their related parties as gifts, suggesting that investors interpret stock gifts as a signal that stock 
prices are relatively low at the time of the transfer. The evidence implies that the disclosure of stock gifts reveals 
the private information of controlling shareholders. In addition, in order to explain the positive market reaction 
to the gift announcement, I show the economic significance of tax planning strategies conducted by controlling 
shareholders to reduce gift taxes. 
Keywords: Stock gifts, gift taxes, market reaction, controlling shareholders 
 
1. Introduction 
For most Korean firms, controlling shareholders control the management decisions of the firm (Classens, 
Djankov, and Lang 2000). Considering the dictatorial status of controlling shareholders, the ownership change 
between controlling shareholders and related parties has received great attention from the media and investors. 
Among the various strategies implemented for successful ownership change, the gifts of stocks to related 
individuals, typically family members, are the most evident form of ownership transfers 
Under the Korean tax law, the highest applicable inheritance and gift tax rate is 50 percent and the tax base is 
additionally increased by 20-30% if the party bestowing the gift is the largest shareholder.1 Therefore, 
controlling shareholders have a strong incentive to engage in tax avoidance strategies for cross-generational 
wealth transfers. This paper explores whether equity investors understand this incentive to avoid tax by 
examining the stock market reaction to the stock gifts of controlling shareholders. 
Announcing stock gifts reveals the private information of controlling shareholders that can affect stock prices. I 
expect investors to regard stock gifts as good news for two reasons. First, investors can infer that the firm’s stock 
prices are relatively low at the time of the stock gifts of controlling shareholders. Why else would controlling 
shareholders choose to pay gift tax now rather than later? Controlling shareholders are likely to project the 
current stock price to be the lowest over the next few years. Tax planning recommends paying taxes later unless 
the tax payment is substantially larger in the future (Scholes et. al 2009). Second, controlling shareholders also 
have the discretionary power to influence stock prices towards being as low as possible (Jung and Park 2009, 
Lee et al. 2018). If investors can see that controlling shareholders have the incentive and means for reducing gift 
tax, investors will interpret the news of stock gifts as a signal to buy. These reasons collectively support the 
positive reaction of equity investors to the stock gifts of controlling shareholders.  
I hand-collected 149 stock gifts from 17,921 ‘report on change in ownership of the largest shareholder’ 
disclosures on Korea Investor’s Network for Disclosure System2 (KIND) for the recent period of 2009-2014. 
However, I use only 94 stock gifts to avoid the issue of confounding disclosure. Additionally, I use a hand-
collected sample of 60 bequests as a control group because the same tax rule is applied to both bequests and 
stock gifts. However, they are different in that effective tax planning before ownership transfer is difficult for 
stock bequests. The 154 stock transfers in my sample are conducted by the controlling shareholders of 119 
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different firms.3 
It is noteworthy that using the bequest sample as a control sample effectively addresses the effect of other 
confounding factors and isolates whether investors understand the tax implications of stock gifts. Pinpointing an 
optimal (ex-ante) transfer time for tax saving purpose is not plausible in the case of a bequest. If investors 
understand the difference in the tax planning capacity between stock gifts and stock bequests, they would 
respond positively to the announcement of stock gifts but not to bequests. I find a significant positive market 
reaction to stock gifts but an insignificant reaction to stock bequests. The results suggest that investors react to 
stock gifts because they understand the tax consideration of controlling shareholders.  
In addition, I show the economic significance of the tax planning strategies to reduce gift tax conducted by 
controlling shareholders, in order to explain the positive market reaction to the gift announcement. It is difficult 
to estimate the tax benefits from the efforts of controlling shareholders to depress stock prices during the 
valuation period, because the stock price without the influence of such effort is counterfactual. Therefore, I 
estimate the tax benefits using the data of size and industry matched firms and the expected returns of gift firms 
estimated by FF3, the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993). The mean difference in the four-month 
average closing price between the gift firms and the matched firms is KRW 1,380. On average, the tax benefit 
per transaction amounts to KRW 435,976,500, assuming the gift rate to be at 50%. Using estimated prices from 
the FF3 model, the mean difference between actual and predicted prices is KRW 745 and tax benefits per 
transaction are KRW 235,364,125, on average. 
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, this paper contributes primarily to the empirical research on 
stock gifts. The stock gifts of controlling shareholders receive great attention from investors, regulators and the 
media, but there is a remarkable dearth of empirical studies on the topic. Second, this study examines not only 
whether investors respond to the stock gifts but also why they respond by showing the economic significance of 
the gift tax incentive of controlling shareholders. I document evidence that equity investors understand the tax 
saving incentives of controlling shareholders and use it for their investment decisions by comparing the 
difference between the responses to gifts and bequests. Finally, this paper contributes to the line of corporate 
governance research. Similar to the studies on U.S. data (Shleifer and Vishny 1997), studies on corporate 
governance with Korean data are mainly concentrated on the mechanisms for monitoring managers and not 
controlling shareholders. This is perplexing after one considers who ultimately controls the top managers of 
Korean firms.4 This paper helps to place more attention on theories and empirical studies regarding the 
monitoring of controlling shareholders rather than managers. 
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 delineates the institutional and legal background of 
stock gifts in Korea. In Section 3, I develop the hypotheses based on the review of the related literature on 
stock gifts and corporate governance. Section 4 outlines the sample and empirical research design, while 
Section 5 reports the main results. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
II. Institutional Background of Stock Gifts Disclosure 
Currently, a disclosure form solely for the stock gifts of controlling shareholders is not available. Instead, 
Securities and Exchange Act 60 requires firms to disclose any change in the ownership of their controlling 
shareholders.5 Companies submit a ‘report on change in ownership of the largest shareholder’ to the Financial 
Supervisory Service (FSS), reporting a reason for the change and the details of ownership status. In the event of 
a stock gift from the firm’s controlling shareholders, the firm submits the report, citing the reason of change as 
“Gifts”. This information is publicly available on DART (FSS website) and KIND (KRX) websites on the day of 
submission. 
 
III. Related Research and Hypothesis Development  
The existence of any significant investor reaction to a certain piece of news implies that investors find the news 
useful in their investment decisions. In that case, what information can investors extract from the stock gift of the 
controlling shareholders? To answer this question, it is critical to understand the situation that controlling 
shareholders face when they transfer their ownership to related parties, usually their children. When a controlling 
shareholder provides stock gifts to his or her related parties, the donee of the gift is subject to heavy gift tax, 
often close to 50 percent of the value of gifted stocks. Therefore to reduce this tax burden, controlling 
shareholders have strong incentives to use their discretionary power to influence management decisions.  
Controlling shareholders who plan to gift stocks tend to devise more aggressive tax-saving strategies beyond 
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timing strategies to mitigate the tax bites. Jung and Park (2009) and Lee et al. (2018) are studies that address the 
active strategy of controlling shareholders who plan for stock gifts: They examine whether controlling 
shareholders attempt to influence stock prices when they give stock gifts. Jung and Park (2009) shows that 
controlling shareholders tend to disclose more bad news on the firm and less good news during the valuation 
period.6 Additionally, Lee et al. (2018) finds income-decreasing discretionary accruals during the valuation 
period to depress the stock prices on which gift tax is based.  
The empirical results listed above suggest that controlling shareholders seem to use their informational 
advantage and discretionary power for the purpose of tax reduction. If investors understand the tax-motivated 
incentives related to stock gifts of controlling shareholders, investors would infer from the disclosure of the stock 
gifts that stock prices are relatively low at the moment, which is good news to investors. Put differently, the 
private information of controlling shareholders (e.g., undisclosed good news to increase the stock price) is 
revealed to the investors in the market by the announcement of stock gifts. In addition, investors may interpret 
the controlling shareholder’s stock gifts to family members, opposed to selling to a third party, as a signal of a 
positive long term prospect of the firm. Therefore, I expect that investors will perceive the stock gift of 
controlling shareholder as good news. My first hypothesis, in its alternative form, is as follows.  
 
H1: Investors react positively to the announcement of the stock gifts of controlling shareholders because they 
understand the tax incentive of controlling shareholders. 
 
IV. SAMPLE AND RESEARCH DESIGN  
Sample selection 
The sample for this study consists of the KRX listed firms that disclose stock gifts and bequests of controlling 
shareholders given to their related parties in the period of 2009 to 2014. I collect stock bequests as well as stock 
gifts to compare the market response to stock gifts and stock bequests. I identify the firms for my sample by 
inspecting the original copies of all ‘reports on change in ownership of the largest shareholder’ disclosed in the 
KIND system (Korea Investor’s Network for Disclosure System) for the sample period.7 KIND provides more 
disclosures than DART because KIND includes the reports submitted by delisted firms as well. Most of the 
disclosures report the gift date and the number of shares given, but there is no information on the stock’s market 
price at the time of gift announcements. Therefore, to obtain the value of gifts and stock returns, I obtain stock 
prices and financial data from the FnGuide database. To avoid the survivorship bias, I include the firms whose 
controlling shareholders gifted or bequeathed their stocks during the period but are currently delisted. To address 
confounding disclosure issue, I exclude stock gift disclosures with any confounding disclosures that can affect 
the stock price during the window of five trading days before and five trading days after the stock gift 
disclosure.8 The final sample consists of 154 transactions (94 stock gifts, 60 stock bequests) that involve 119 
different firms.  
 
Market reaction to stock gift disclosure 
To conduct a more robust examination on the market reaction to stock gifts, I execute all tests with a stock 
bequest sample as a control sample. This method controls the possibility of compounding effects because the 
same tax law applies to stock gifts and stock bequests. The two types of transactions are only different in the 
level of discretion that controlling shareholders can exercise. Unlike stock gifts, stock bequests leave controlling 
shareholders little room for discretion to reduce gift tax because controlling shareholders cannot choose when to 
die.  
I use the date on which the firm filed a ‘report on change in ownership of the largest shareholder’ to the FSS as 
the event date to examine whether there was a market response to the stock gift announcement. For univariate 
tests, I refer to Menon and Williams (2010). To test H1, I calculate daily market-adjusted excess returns for the 
event date and for the five days preceding and succeeding the event date (t=0).9 I also measure raw cumulative 
returns (RAW) and cumulative excess returns (CAR) as well.10 
 
Multivariate Analyses 
To test H1, I estimate the ordinary least squares regressions of eq. (1) with the cumulative raw stock return and 
cumulative net-of-market stock return as dependent variables, both measured over the three days (one days 
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preceding and one day succeeding) around each stock gift announcement. The explanatory variable of interest is 
the coefficient of GIFT_D. Consistent with the hypotheses, I expect a positive coefficient for GIFT_D, which 
would indicate that the market reacts positively to the stock gifts (compared to stock bequests) of controlling 
shareholders even after controlling for other firm characteristics which may influence the level of market 
reaction (H1). 
 
CAR = α + β1GIFT_D + β2LNTV + β3LNSIZE + β4 LAG  + ε      (1) 
where,  
 
Dependent Variable 
CAR = The cumulative market-adjusted excess returns in the event window (t-1, t+1) around the 
event date (t = 0), which is the date a stock gift or a stock bequest is announced. 
 
Test Variables 
GIFT_D  = A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm’s controlling shareholder 
provided stock gifts, and 0 if stocks are bequeathed.  
 
Control Variables 
LNTV = The natural log of the market value of gifted or bequeathed stocks.  
LNSIZE = The natural log of the market value of equity.  
LAG = The number of calendar days between the reported gift (or bequest) date and the FSS 
filing date.  
 
The control variables included in Eq. (1) may affect the level of market reaction to stock gifts or bequests. LNTV 
is the natural log of the market value of each stock transfer (gift or bequest). Larger values for the stock gifts 
(bequests) of controlling shareholders imply larger incentives to use their discretion for tax-saving. If investors 
perceive that controlling shareholders would execute larger stock gifts (bequests) with more precaution, the 
investor reaction is expected to be more significant. LNSIZE, the natural log of the market value of equity, is a 
proxy for firm size, included to control for size effects. For example, larger firms tend to have richer information 
environments, resulting in a smaller market response on the event date. LAG, the difference between the reported 
gift date and the FSS filing date, is included because a reporting delay may influence the magnitude of market 
reaction. The direction of the coefficient of LAG is not clear. A longer delay may imply a more opportunistic tax-
saving strategy of controlling shareholders, resulting in a bigger reaction. On the other hand, a longer reporting 
delay may imply a higher likelihood of information leakage, reducing the reaction to the official disclosure. 
 
V. Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
I examine the market reaction to stock gifts by comparing the reaction to stock bequests. If stock gifts and stock 
bequests have drastically different values in terms of control variables, it would be more challenging to analyze 
the two types of samples in one regression. Therefore, I present the descriptive statistics of stock gifts in 
comparison with stock bequests. Panel A and Panel B in Table 1 show the descriptive statistics for the variables 
in Eq. (1) for the stock gift sample and stock bequest sample, respectively. 
The mean CAR (-1,1) is 0.78 for the gift sample and -0.76 for the bequest sample. RAW (-1,1) also shows a 
similar pattern. The investor’s reaction to gifts is clearly more positive than the reaction to bequests, although the 
same tax rule applies to both gifts and bequests. This is consistent with our prediction that investors perceive the 
stock gifts of controlling shareholders as good news. The median gift size is KRW 1.67 billion, with a mean of 
KRW 6.8 billion. Compared to gifts, the size of bequests are larger with a median (mean) of KRW 1.77 (8.89) 
billion, indicating the inability to adjust the size of ownership transfer at each transaction. On average, firms 
report the gift two to three days after the stock gifts are actually given, but the delay is not material considering 
the distribution of LAG (median is one day).  
 It is also noted in Table 1 that the stock gift and stock bequest samples are similar in terms of the firm’s market 
value (LNSIZE), supporting the use of bequests as a control sample. 
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Empirical Results 
Market reaction to stock gifts 
In Panel A of Table 2, I compare the stock gift sample and the stock bequest sample by examining the daily 
market-adjusted excess returns for the event date and the five days that precede and follow the event. I find that 
for the gift sample, the mean excess returns for Day +1 is significantly positive (p-value is 0.002). The positive 
return of Day +1 (0.87 percent) is well explained by the observation that gift disclosures usually occur after the 
market closes. In contrast to the strong reaction to stock gift sample, investors do not seem to show any strong 
response to the news of the stock bequest of controlling shareholders.  
This observation confirms that investors find the news of stock gifts to be more useful in trading than that of 
stock bequests, although the two types of transactions are both ownership transfers that are subject to the same 
tax rule. The cumulative three-day excess return (-1, 1) for stock gifts in Panel B is approximately 0.78 percent 
and statistically significant (p-value is 0.024). The results shown in Table 2 suggest a positive investor reaction 
to the stock gift announcement, consistent with H1. 
Table 3 presents regressions on the market reaction to the report dates of stock gifts and bequests. I regress 
RAW(-1,1) and CAR(-1,1) on GIFT_D and other control variables. Column (1) uses the raw stock return and 
column (2) uses the market-adjusted return as the dependent variable. The market-adjusted return is defined as 
the difference between the raw stock return and the KOSPI index. As in Table 3, the positive coefficient of 
GIFT_D is significant after controlling the value of transfer (LNTV), size of firms (LNSIZE), and the reporting 
lag (LAG), supporting the univariate results in Table 2. I find that other independent variables (LNSIZE, LNTV, 
LAG) are not statistically important in explaining the market reaction to stock transfers. 
In Table 4, I run the same regression in Table 3, but only for the sample of gift firms. The positive coefficient (p-
value is 0.066) of LNTV implies that larger amounts of stock gifts by controlling shareholders lead to greater 
market reaction, suggesting that investors infer the tax incentive of controlling shareholders to be greater when 
the amount of gifted stock is larger.   
 
Robustness Tests 
The effect of earnings announcements 
The observed positive reaction to stock gifts may be due to the compounding effects by other disclosures or 
news announced concurrently with stock gifts. Figure 1, Panel A and Panel B show the seasonal pattern of 
controlling shareholders’ gift or bequest announcements, displayed by month and year respectively. I show the 
pattern, especially in Panel B to address the concern on whether the reaction to announcement is likely to be 
compounded by earnings announcements. The disclosures occur regularly, not concentrated in a specific year or 
month, except the peak in December. The large concentration of December gifts or bequests does not imply a 
possibility of compounding effects because earnings for the third quarter and the fourth quarter tend to be 
announced in October and January respectively. To my knowledge, no major periodic event of a firm is disclosed 
in December. 
Timing of Gifts by controlling shareholders 
Although Kim and Lee (2003) find evidence of timing stock gifts, the evidence may not hold for my sample 
period because their sample period (1993-2002) is different from mine. Therefore, I examine whether controlling 
shareholders use timing strategies for my sample period (2009-2014) to reduce their gift taxes. Figure 2 
illustrates the movement of company stock prices during the one year period ((-120, 120) in trading days) around 
the dates their controlling shareholders transferred stocks to their related parties. Cumulative returns are 
presented on a net-of-market basis with the KOSPI market index return subtracted from the raw stock return. 
The figure presents two lines: a solid series for the firms whose controlling shareholders make gifts of stocks, 
and a dashed series for the firms whose controlling shareholders make bequests of stocks. A comparison of the 
two series in Figure 2 supports my argument that controlling shareholders use timing strategies to minimize 
taxes levied on their family members. The dashed series (bequests) do not seem to show a clear pattern. In 
contrast, the solid series show that stock gifts occur when stock price tends to recover after a continuation of 
decline. After the stock gifts at t = 0, stock prices tend to increase and the slope becomes far steeper at the 
moment the valuation period ends at t = 40. On average, it seems that controlling shareholders avoid the run-ups 
of close to 8% over the three month after the valuation period. The clear evidence of timing shown in Figure 2 
supports my argument that investors react positively to the news of stock gifts of controlling shareholders 
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expecting a sharp increase of stock prices after the stock gifts.  
Economic significance of the tax incentive of controlling shareholders 
To explain the positive market reaction shown in Table 2, I examine the economic significance of the tax 
incentives of the controlling shareholders during the valuation period. Panels A, B, and C of Figure 3 show the 
price movement around the date of stock gift compared to the market, size and industry matched firms, and the 
predicted prices of gift firms estimated using the three-factor model described in Fama and French (1993), 
respectively. For each comparison, I use the standardized price of each firm. The standardized price is set 100 at 
the trading day t-120. The standardized price after t-119 and before t+120 is obtained by multiplying daily return 
to the price of the previous day. Panel A illustrates the behavior of company stock prices around the dates of gifts 
against the market. On average, gift transactions occur (t=0) when gift returns surpass market returns. During the 
two-month valuation period after the stock gift, the increasing pattern of the stock price seems to be attenuated 
by the opportunistic tax-avoiding behavior of controlling shareholders (Jung and Park 2009, Lee et al. 2018). 
After the end of valuation period, the price of the gift firm soars, deviating from the market return, consistent 
with the suspicion that the stock price following the gift had been suppressed by the opportunistic behavior of 
controlling shareholders.  
How much tax benefit would those controlling shareholders get from their efforts to depress the price of the 
gifted stock? It is difficult to estimate the tax benefit from the efforts of controlling shareholders to depress stock 
prices during the valuation period because the stock price without the influence of such efforts is counterfactual. 
Therefore, I use the prices of size industry matched firms and model predicted prices of gift firms to approximate 
the tax benefits. Panel B presents the price pattern of gift stocks in comparison to that of the firms matched by 
size and industry. The comparison of the two series clearly shows that prices of gift firms are lower than those of 
the size industry matched firms during the valuation period. However, outside of the valuation period, the price 
level and pattern are similar. I estimate the tax benefit using the price difference during the valuation period. The 
mean difference in the four-month average closing prices between the gift firms and the matched firms is KRW 
1,380. On average, the tax benefit by transaction amounts to KRW 435,976,500, assuming a gift tax rate of 50%.  
Panel C compares the movement of the actual prices of the gift firms to that of the model predicted prices. The 
model predicted prices are obtained using the estimation of the three-factor model described in Fama and French 
(1993). Following Heron and Lie (2007), my estimation period is the one-year period ending 50 days before the 
first day of the valuation period. The trading day relative to the gift date ends in t+40 due to the data availability 
of the portfolio returns used for the calculation of the three risk factors. In Panel C, on average, the actual price is 
lower than the predicted price during the valuation period. Based on the price difference, the approximation of 
tax benefit is KRW 745 (KRW 235,364,125) per share (transaction), assuming the 50% gift tax rate. Overall, the 
size of tax benefits estimated using the prices in Panel B and Panel C supports the economic significance of the 
controlling shareholders’ incentive to reduce gift tax.   
 
VI. Conclusion 
In this paper, I examine how equity investors respond to the disclosure of the stock gifts of controlling 
shareholders and why they find the disclosure useful. Using hand-collected data for the recent period of 2009 to 
2014, I find that investors react positively to the announcement of the stock gifts. These results suggest that 
investors understand the tax incentives of controlling shareholders and infer the private information on the stock 
price movements revealed by the announcement of stock gifts.  
I admit that the early disclosures of stock gifts through press releases are probable but not considered in this 
study. However, my results remain significant despite the possibility of early disclosure, providing more 
conservative and robust results. The positive market reaction indicates that investors understand the prevalent 
features of the corporate governance of Korean firms: the informational advantage and discretionary power of 
controlling shareholders. The reaction to stock gifts manifests that the attempts by controlling shareholders to 
reduce stock gift taxes have been successful. Thus, my findings should be of interest to tax policy makers in 
Korea. The study provides empirical evidence that the most recent change in the tax law enacted to discourage 
controlling shareholders from avoiding gift taxes have not curtailed the practice. 
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Notes 
Note 1. The premium is 30% if the majority shareholder has more than 50% of issued stock. For example, if the 
value of gifted stocks from a shareholder with over 50% is KRW 50 billion, the gift tax amounts to 
approximately KRW 24.1 billion.  
Note 2. http://kind.krx.co.kr, website operated by the Korea Exchange (KRX) 
Note 3. 154 stock transfers include 94 stock gifts and 60 bequests. 
Note 4. Ownership tends to be concentrated in code law countries, such as Korea (La Porta et al. 1998; La Porta 
et al. 1999; Denis and McConnell 2003; Gillan and Starks 2003). The concentration of ownership allows 
controlling shareholders to have significant influence on management’s decisions. 
Note 5. The scope of related parties, Enforcement Decree for Inheritance and Gift Tax 12(2) 
Note 6. Valuation period is defined as the four-month (two month before and two month after) period around the 
gift date. 
Note 7. There are 17,921 reports in total. The most common reason for ownership change is the change by 
trading (purchase and sales). 
Note 8. Example of confounding disclosure includes audit reports, quarterly reports and dividend announcement, 
etc. 
Note 9. Daily excess return = raw return – market (KOSPI composite index) return 
Note 10. The cumulative excess returns for the announcement period is computed by adding the daily excess 
returns. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Variables 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3 
Panel A : Stock Gifts (N=94) 
 
   
CAR 0.7781 3.2886 -1.3400 0.4650 2.4900 
RAW 0.7109 3.3581 -1.8400 0.0150 2.6800 
TV(100 mil won) 68.7286 170.8453 4.9760 16.7441 47.2500 
LNTV 21.0775 1.8069 20.0253 21.2385 22.2761 
GIFTSHS 631,850 1,313,617 47,285 196,126 600,000 
SIZE(100 mil won) 4,558.5654 13071.8540 629.5860 1219.2400 2,711.3865 
LNSIZE 25.4770 1.0705 24.7059 25.3434 26.0918 
LAG 2.5638 4.0813 0.0000 1.0000 3.0000 
Panel B : Stock Bequests (N=60) 
 
   
CAR -0.7603 4.2914 -3.0250 -0.7500 0.9900 
RAW -0.2135 4.7127 -2.4100 -0.3750 1.9600 
TV(100 mil won) 88.9014 170.1632 4.5551 17.7259 68.9166 
LNTV 21.1712 2.2258 19.9345 21.2957 22.6444 
GIFTSHS 681,755 1,213,477 27,073 162,249 626,213 
SIZE(100 mil won) 5,440.0405 16,808.0200 442.3158 1,151.1383 3,078.1014 
LNSIZE 25.6744 1.4108 24.5126 25.4682 26.4522 
LAG 5.6333 12.2516 1.0000 3.0000 6.0000 
Panel A and Panel B of this table report the descriptive statistics for the stock gift sample and stock bequest 
sample, respectively.  
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TABLE 2. Daily Excess Returns of the Report Dates of Stock Gifts and Bequests  
Panel A: Daily Excess Returns (Market-Adjusted) 
   Gifts  Bequests 
             
Day 
 
Mean 
 
Std.Dev Median Pr > |t| 
 
Mean 
 
Std.Dev Median Pr > |t| 
-5 
 
0.0092  2.0615 0.1600 0.644 
 
-0.1089 
 
2.1711 -0.3800 0.694 
-4 
 
-0.0683 
 
2.4562 -0.0950 0.788 
 
-0.4384 
 
2.1295 -0.0650 0.110 
-3 
 
0.4077 
 
2.3828 0.1550 0.101 
 
-0.4028 * 1.7898 0.0200 0.084 
-2 
 
-0.1563 
 
1.7148 -0.1700 0.379 
 
0.0179 
 
2.0511 -0.3250 0.945 
-1 
 
0.0201 
 
2.3128 -0.2950 0.933 
 
-0.4067 
 
2.3588 -0.2700 0.183 
0 
 
-0.1059 
 
2.2306 -0.0250 0.647 
 
-0.4198 
 
2.0404 -0.3150 0.116 
1 
 
0.8664 *** 2.6265 0.4100 0.002 
 
0.6131 
 
3.1884 0.1300 0.135 
2 
 
-0.0866 
 
1.9100 0.1550 0.661 
 
-0.1482 
 
2.4947 -0.2500 0.644 
3 
 
0.0104 
 
2.1440 -0.2200 0.963 
 
0.1895 
 
2.0422 0.2000 0.471 
4 
 
-0.0546 
 
2.3121 -0.2700 0.820 
 
-0.1255 
 
2.2541 0.0950 0.663 
5  -0.0923   2.3714 -0.0200 0.707  -0.0995 
 
1.8577 0.2700 0.677 
 
Panel B: Cumulative Returns (-1, 1) 
 
 
RAW 
 
CAR 
 
Mean 
 
Std. Dev. Pr > |t| 
 
Mean 
 
Std. Dev. Pr > |t| 
Gifts 0.7109 ** 3.3713 0.044  0.7781 ** 3.2812 0.024 
Bequests 0.3113 
 
5.5106 0.658 
 
-0.2797 
 
5.0073 0.662 
 
Panel A and Panel B of this table present statistics for daily excess returns and cumulative returns around the 
report dates of stock gifts and bequests, respectively. The event date (t=0) is the date when a stock gift or a stock 
bequest is announced. Significance levels are for t-tests for the mean daily and cumulative excess returns. *, **, 
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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TABLE 3. Regressions on the Market Reaction to the Report Dates of Stock Gifts and Bequests  
 
 (1) (2) 
Y: Cumulative returns (-1,1) RAW CAR (raw-market) 
   
GIFT_D 0.9713* 1.3227** 
 (0.080) (0.016) 
LNTV 0.0580 0.1588 
 (0.707) (0.298) 
LNSIZE 0.2222 0.1037 
 (0.352) (0.660) 
LAG 0.0928 0.0962 
 (0.170) (0.150) 
Intercept -7.4286 -6.8337 
 (0.225) (0.259) 
   
Adjusted R2 0.0092 0.0231 
This table presents the results of the regression where the dependent variable is the cumulative returns of market 
reaction around the report dates of stock gifts and bequests. I regress RAW (-1,1) and CAR(-1,1) on GIFT_D and 
other control variables. Column (1) uses the raw stock return as a dependent variable. Column (2) uses the 
market-adjusted return as a dependent variable. The market-adjusted return is defined as the difference between 
the raw stock return and the KOSPI index. P-values are in the parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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TABLE 4. Excess Returns of the Report Dates of Stock Gifts (Gift Firms Only) 
 
 (1) (2) 
Y: Cumulative returns (-1,1) Raw CAR (raw-market) 
   
LNTV 0.3867* 0.3955* 
 (0.080) (0.066) 
LNSIZE -0.3902 -0.2687 
 (0.260) (0.424) 
LAG 0.1342 0.1492* 
 (0.146) (0.097) 
Intercept 2.15754 -1.0957 
 (0.800) (0.894) 
   
Adjusted R2 0.0134 0.0176 
 
This table presents regressions on the market reaction to the report dates of stock gifts only. I regress RAW (-1,1) 
and CAR(-1,1) on GIFT_D and other control variables. Column (1) uses the raw stock return as a dependent 
variable. Column (2) uses the market-adjusted return as a dependent variable. The market-adjusted returns are 
defined as the difference between the raw stock returns and returns on the KOSPI index. P-values are in the 
parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, 
respectively.  
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FIGURE 1: Distribution of Disclosure on Controlling Shareholders’ Gift or Bequest Announcements by 
Year and Month 
Panel A: Sample Distribution by Disclosure Year 
 
 
Panel B: Sample Distribution by Disclosure Month 
 
 
 
 
Panel A and Panel B of this figure illustrate distribution of disclosure on controlling shareholders’ gift or bequest 
announcements by year and month, respectively 
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FIGURE 2. Cumulative Abnormal Stock Returns during the One-year Period around Gift (Bequest) Date 
 
 
 
This figure shows cumulative net-of-market stock returns during the one year period (-120, 120) in trading days) 
for two samples of companies whose controlling shareholders transfer stocks to their related parties. The solid 
(dashed) line shows mean returns for the firms whose controlling shareholders make gifts (bequests) of stocks. 
Abnormal returns are defined as the difference between each stock’s raw return and the market (KOSPI) index. 
Event date t indicates a gift date or a bequest date. 
 
FIGURE 3 Price Movement around Gift Date 
Panel A: Gift firms vs. Market  
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Panel B: Gift firms vs. Size and Industry matched firms 
 
Panel C: Gift firms (Actual price vs. FF3 predicted price) 
 
 
Figure 3 shows the price movement around the date of stock gift. Panel A compares the price of gift firms with 
market index (KOSPI index). Panel B compares the price of gift firms with price of size and industry matched 
firms. Panel C compares actual price of gift firms with the predicted price of gift firms estimated from the Fama 
French three factor model. 
